On Wednesday, Lord Beaverbrook submitted another resignation to Winston Churchill, citing ill health but asking that their friendship remain intact. Churchill finally accepted that Beaverbrook could not continue as minister of aircraft production, especially after the damage Beaverbrook had done to relations between the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Air Ministry. Even so, Churchill was unwilling to lose him entirely, and on May 1 he appointed Beaverbrook as the new Minister of State, a vague coordinating role over production ministries that Beaverbrook accepted after further protest.

Although many in Whitehall likely dreaded Beaverbrook’s return in another powerful position, the public generally welcomed the appointment. That same evening, Churchill and Clementine traveled overnight to Plymouth, which had just suffered five severe bombing raids in nine days. The destruction there stunned Churchill more than any previous bombed-city visit: neighborhoods had been wiped out, an air-raid shelter in Portland Square had taken a direct hit that killed seventy-six people, and at the naval base wounded sailors lay near coffins being nailed shut for the dead.

The scale of Plymouth’s ruin deeply shook Churchill. John Colville, who accompanied him, recorded the grim details and later noted how visibly affected Churchill was. As Churchill’s car passed a newsreel camera, his expression conveyed grief and disbelief, and the visit stayed with him after he returned to Chequers around midnight.

At Chequers, Churchill was met with a fresh series of military setbacks: a destroyer had been sunk at Malta and blocked the Grand Harbour, mechanical problems had halted a transport carrying tanks to the Middle East, and British forces in Iraq were meeting unexpectedly strong resistance. Worst of all, Franklin Roosevelt sent a discouraging telegram suggesting that the loss of more territory, including in the Middle East, might not matter greatly because such regions offered little raw material value. Churchill read this as evidence that the United States still cared mainly about its own immediate safety and might leave Britain to face the larger danger alone.

In response, Churchill wrote both Anthony Eden and Roosevelt, insisting that the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would have grave consequences, prolong the war, and increase risks in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Growing more candid with Roosevelt, Churchill argued that the only decisive answer to spreading pessimism in Turkey, the Near East, and Spain would be for the United States to enter the war as a belligerent. Later, by the fire with Harriman, Pug Ismay, and Colville, Churchill described a nightmare future in which Hitler dominated Europe, Asia, and Africa and forced Britain and America toward an unwilling peace. Colville judged Churchill to be in the darkest mood he had ever seen, with Plymouth’s devastation haunting him above all.